We present an identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption scheme, where most of computations are carried out when the message is not available (i.e., off-line stage) 
Introduction
In public key systems, the authenticity of information can be guaranteed by digital signatures, whereas the information confidentiality is achieved using encryption schemes. One can first sign and then encrypt a message when both authenticity and confidentially are desired. This approach is known as sign-then-encrypt. The main disadvantage of this solution is that it expands the final ciphertext's size and increase the sender and receiver's computing time, as signing and encryption are preformed in two separate steps. This motivated Zheng [21] to propose a cryptographic primitive signcryption. The idea of this kind of primitive is to perform encryption and signature in a single logical step in order to obtain confidentiality and authentication more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt approach. Based on discrete algorithm problem, signcryption costs 58% less in average computation time and 70% less in message expansion than sign-then-encrypt does. Using RSA cryptosystem, it costs on average 50% less in computation time and 91% less in message expansion than sign-then-encrypt does. After the introduction of signcryption, many efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed [2, 18, 11, 6, 4, 20, 10, 12, 15] .
Earlier signcryption schemes were only considered in traditional public key cryptography, where there is a certificate authority (CA) who generates certificates to bind a user with its public key. History has shown that the certificates in traditional PKI are costly to use and manage. Shamir [16] introduced the notion of Identity-based (or IDbased) cryptography to easy the above problem. In the new setting, the user's public key is some unique information about the identity of the user (e.g., a user's email address) which is assumed to be publicly known. The ability to use identities as public keys avoids the need to distribute public key certificates. This can be very useful in applications such as email where the recipient is often off-line and unable to present a public-key certificate while the sender encrypts a message. In ID-based system, a trusted third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG), generates users' private keys. The PKG first publishes a master public key, and retains the corresponding master secret key. To obtain a private key, one should contact PKG, which uses the master secret key to generate the corresponding private key. Encryption or verification in ID-based cryptography only needs PKG's master public key and the user's identity information. In [16] , Shamir proposed a concrete ID-based signature (IBS) scheme, but the construction of Identitybased encryption (IBE) remained as an open problem until the first efficient and fully functional identity-based encryption scheme proposed in [3] . This construction is built from a bilinear map (for example, the Weil pairing on elliptic curves). After that, identity-based cryptographic protocols from pairings have been extensively investigated by researchers [13, 5] .
The first identity-based signcryption scheme was proposed in [11] . In this construction, the signature of the plaintext is visible in the ciphertext and thus, does not satisfy the semantic security. This flaw was fixed by Libert and Quisquater [10] by proposing a new construction. Boyen [4] proposed a multipurpose identity-based signcryption and formally defined the security notions of signcryption in identity-based cryptography. After that, Chen and Malone-Lee [6] proposed a more efficient scheme in the model defined in [4] .
The notion of on-line/off-line signature was introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Micali [8] . The idea is to divide the signature generating procedure by two phases. The first phase is performed off-line (before the message to be signed is known) and the second phase is performed on-line (after the message to be signed is given). On-line/off-line signature schemes are useful, as in many applications the signer has a very limited response time once the message is presented, but he can carry out costly computations between consecutive signing requests. On-line/off-line signature schemes are particularly useful in smart card applications: The off-line phase is implemented either during the card manufacturing process or as a background computation whenever the card is connected to power, and the on-line phase uses the stored result of the off-line phase to sign actual messages. The on-line phase is typically very fast, and hence can be executed efficiently even on a weak processor.
Some signature schemes can be naturally partitioned into on-line and off-line phases. For example, the first step in the Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr, El-Gamal and DSS signature schemes does not depend on the given message, and can thus be carried out off-line. Even, Goldreich, and Micali [8] proposed the first generic method to convert any signature scheme into an on-line/off-line one. Their construction is not efficient as it increases the length of each signature by a quadratic factor. In 2001, Shamir and Tauman proposed another generic method to achieve on-line/offline signing [17] . They use the notion of a trapdoor hash function to develop a paradigm called "hash-sign-switch", which can convert any signature scheme into a highly efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme. The on-line signing phase of their scheme maintains the efficiency of Even, Goldreich and Micali's scheme(requiring only one hash function), but the size of each signature increases only by a factor of two. Chen et al [7] proposed a much more efficient generic on-line/off-line signature scheme. Compared with Shamir-Tauman's signature scheme, their scheme has the advantages of the lower computation and storage cost for the off-line phase, and the lower communication cost for the on-line phase.
The notion of on-line/off-line signcryption was introduced by An, Dodis, and Tabin [1] . They did not give any concrete method in their work but general security proofs on signcryption schemes. They gave the security analysis of "encrypt-then-sign", "sign-then-encrypt" and "committhen-encrypt-and-sign" under both insider and outsider attack models. The latter method can be combined with the "hash-sign-switch" technique to produce a generic online/off-line signcryption. The first practical on-line/offline signcryption was proposed by Zhang, Mu, and Susilo in 2005 [20] . Their scheme is efficient as the on-line part does not require any exponent computations. They also employed the notion of short signatures, which contributes to the short signature length of the on-line signature part.
Motivation and Contribution
To date, there is no construction of identity-based online/off-line signcryption protocol in the literature. However, it would be of great practical interest to design an identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption. As it avoids the need to distribute public key certificates, identity-based cryptography has found many advantages in the systems as Adhoc networks, Mobile networks, etc. However, entities in these systems are normally less powerful than their counterparts such as desktops. This limits their ability to perform public key operations as encryption and signing. It will be certainly desirable if the above operations can be done in an efficient manner and, entities are able to perform some of operations beforehand. All these desirable properties can be achieved in identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption.
Our contributions of this paper are twofold. We first formally define the identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption and its security models. We specify two security notions, namely ciphertext indistinguishable and existentially unforgeable, in identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption. Both two notions capture the practical requirements of identity-based on-line/off-line signcryption. We then propose an ID-based on-line/off-line signcryption. Our construction is based on pairing on elliptic curves. It can achieve authenticity and confidentiality simultaneously in an efficient manner. All costly operations are performed in the off-line phase. The on-line part does not require any operations in the pairing group G, and only includes one symmetric key encryption and the addition operations modular q, where q is a prime and its length depends on the system security parameter. We give a rigorous proof to show that our scheme is ciphertext indistinguishable under decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and is existentially unforgeable under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. We finally show the potential application of our scheme in secure communications in wireless sensor network (WSN).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly reviews the preliminaries required in this paper. In Section 3, we formally define the identity-based on-line/offline signcryption. We present our scheme and prove its security in our model in Section 4 and Section 5. Section 6 shows the potential applications of our scheme. We conclude this paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Before presenting our results we briefly review the definition for groups equipped with a bilinear map, and the definitions of CDHP and DBDHP.
Bilinear Mapping
Let k be a security parameter and q be a k-bit prime number. Let us consider groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q. For our purposes, we need a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 satisfying the following properties:
ab .
Non-degeneracy: for any point
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q), for P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Such non-degenerate admissible maps over cyclic groups can be obtained from the Weil or the Tate pairing over supersingular elliptic curves [3] or abelian varieties [14] .
Security Assumptions
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the following problems.
Definition 1. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
An algorithm A has advantage in solving CDHP in group G if Pr[A(P, aP, bP ) = abP ] ≥ , where the probability is over the random choices of (a, b), and the coin tosses of A. We say an algorithm A (t, )-breaks CDHP in G if in time t, A has advantage in solving CDHP.
Definition 2. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)
Given two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear map e :
decide whether h = e(P, P ) abc or not.
Syntax and Security Models of Identitybased On-line/Off-line Signcryption
We define the syntax and the security models of identitybased on-line/off-line signcryption. 
Syntax of ID-based On-line/Off-line Signcryption

UnSigncrypt(params, C, ID
Given params, a ciphertext C, the sender's identity ID S and the receiver's secret key d IDR as input, this algorithm outputs the plaintext m or the symbol "⊥". "⊥" denotes that C is an invalid ciphertext between ID S and ID R .
For simplicity, we omit the notation of params from the inputs of OffSign, OnSigncrypt and UnSigncrypt in the rest of this paper.
Correctness. The algorithm UnSigncrypt will output a plaintext if the ciphertext and the off-line signature are generated as defined above.
Security Models of Identity-based Online/Off-line Signcryption
We now state the security of identity-based on-line/offline signcryption.
The first security notion is the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. It is defined by the game as follows.
Definition 4. We say that an identity-based on-line/offline signcryption scheme (IDSC) has the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks property (IND-IDSC-CCA2) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters params to the adversary A. Remarks. In Def. 5, the adversary is allowed to ask the private key corresponding to the identity ID B in the challenging trip (C * , ID A , ID B ). This prevent a dishonest recipient ID B to send a ciphertext to himself on behalf of ID A and to try to convince a third party that ID A was the sender.
The adversary
The Scheme
In this section, we present our ID-based on-line/off-line signcryption scheme that satisfies the model introduced in Section 3. Assume that Alice and Bob are the sender and the receiver, respectively. The protocol is described as follows.
Setup: Given security parameters k, n and G 1 , G 2 of order q and generator P of G 1 , picks a random s ∈ R Z * q , and sets P pub = sP . Chooses cryptographic hash functions H 0 :
The system parameters are (P, P pub , H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ). The master key is s. H 0 , H 1 , H 2 and H 3 will be regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract:
Given an identity ID, the algorithm computes d ID = sH 0 (ID) and outputs it as the private key related to ID corresponding to Q ID = H 0 (ID). OnSigncrypt: Given a message m ∈ Z * q and an off-line signature (S, U ), Alice sets k 3 = H 2 (k 2 ) first. The message encryption is done with k 3 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm E such as AES. The ciphertext is c = E k3 (m). Computes r = H 1 (c, S, U ) and on-line signature σ = rx + y; returns ciphertext (c, S, U, σ).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext (c, S, U, σ), (1) Computes
and decrypts the message D k3 (c) = m. The correct verification requires to verify the equality e(σP pub + rS, P ) = e(U + k 1 P + rQ IDA , P pub ), where r = H 1 (c, S, U ).
Correctness:
The consistency is easy to verify by the bilinearity of the map as follows:
Performance and size: the proposed algorithms satisfy the requirement of on-line/off-line signcryption as all expensive computations are done in the off-line phase. The on-line phase consists of only two hashings, one multiplication, and a symmetric-key encryption. The size of our signature part (c, S, U, σ) is 2 log 2 ρ + log 2 q + 160, in which ρ stands for the safe length of group G 1 .
Proofs of Security
We now provide the security analysis of our scheme. Our proof for IND-IDSC-CCA2 is inspired by the proof in [10] . 3 . We assume that any Signcrypt or Unsigncrypt request on a pair of identities happens after A asked the hashing H 0 of these identities. Any key extraction query on an identity is also preceded by a hash query on the same identity. We also assume A never makes an unsigncryption query on a ciphertext obtained from the signcryption oracle. He only makes unsigncryption queries for observed ciphertexts.
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, we assume we have an IND-IDSC-CCA2 adversary called A that is able to distinguish ciphertexts during the game of definition 4 with an advantage when running in a time
At the beginning of the game, B gives A the system parameters with P pub = cP (c is unknown to B and plays the role of the PKG's master key 
If such a pair is found, B answers by k 3e , otherwise he answers A by a random binary sequence k 3 ← R {0, 1} n such that no entry (., k 3 ) exists in L 2 and puts the pair
H 3 requests: on a H 3 (g e ) request, B searches a pair (g e , k e ) in the list L 3 . If such a pair is found, B answers by k e , otherwise he answers A by a random k ← R Z * q such that no entry (., k) exists in L 3 and puts the pair (g e , k) into L 3 . After a polynomially bounded number of queries, A chooses a pair of identities on which he wishes to be challenged. With a probability at least 1/C pairs of identities, at least one of them will never be the subject of a key extraction query from A. Then, with a probability greater than 1/C 2 qH 0 A will not ask the questions Keygen(ID i ) and Keygen(ID j ). Further, with a probability exactly 1/C The unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks [9] , defined in Definition 5, derives from the security of the scheme in [19] , under the computational DiffieHellman assumption. Due to space limitation, we omit the proof in this version of the paper. One can show that an attacker that is able to forge a signcrypted message must be able to forge a signature for the scheme in [19] .
Key extraction requests: when
Application
A wireless sensor network(WSN) is composed of a large number of sensor nodes that are densely deployed either inside the phenomenon or very close to it. A sensor node will communicate with other nodes or a destination (sink) node frequently. PKI is not suitable for WSN secure communication because of the certificate overhead. Our ID-based Scheme may be applied for sending encrypted data in WSN, there is no need to bind a public key to its owners identity since those are one single thing. Because of limited computation power and network bandwidth in WSN, some efficient security algorithms for secure mobile communications are needed. Our Scheme achieves both ciphertext size efficiency and computation efficiency, so it's a good candidate for WSN secure communication.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an ID-based on-line/offline signcryption scheme. In our scheme, the on-line computation is very efficient. Our scheme is proved secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks based on the random oracle model assuming that CDH problem is hard, and it's also secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks under the notion of indistinguishability of ciphertext on the random oracle model assuming that DBDH problem is hard. We also give some application. The scheme may be suitable for WSN secure communication, because of the computation and ciphertext size efficiency. Our future work involves proposing a generic ID-based on-line/off-line signcryption scheme.
